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Micronesia in Review: Issues and Events,  
1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016
Reviews of the Commonwealth of the 
Northern Mariana Islands, Kiribati, 
and Nauru are not included in this 
issue.
Federated States  
of Micronesia
The period covered by this review was 
one of reckoning for the long-term 
sustainability of the Federated States 
of Micronesia (FSM) as a political and 
economic entity. The FSM engaged in 
a renewed effort to stimulate economic 
development, appreciate the fragile 
natural ecosystems long enjoyed and 
safeguarded by the people of the FSM, 
and reexamine the desirability of what 
is perhaps the country’s most conse-
quential bilateral relationship. As the 
scheduled termination of the major 
financial provisions of the amended 
Compact of Free Association (cofa) 
between the FSM and the United 
States nears, the FSM’s national and 
state governments—as well as the 
general populaces they serve—grap-
pled with the purpose, promise, and 
predicaments of the federation and 
strove, in various ways, to establish a 
solid foundation for a federation that 
would be independent in truth as well 
as in law.
From the outset of his administra-
tion, FSM President Peter M Christian 
exhibited a clear-eyed appreciation 
of the federation’s challenges and 
shortcomings. During the joint inau-
guration ceremony on 10 July 2015 
for President Christian, Vice President 
Yosiwo P George, and the members of 
the Nineteenth Congress of the Feder-
ated States of Micronesia, the presi-
dent delivered an inaugural address 
that blamed many of the federation’s 
problems on “the intricacies of tiered 
governments where there are Munici-
pal, State, and National jurisdictions 
all vying to serve the same constitu-
ents, but often tripping over each 
other because of unclear delineation 
of powers, coupled with political 
ambitions of three levels of legislative 
 bodies.” He also noted that the FSM 
was beset by difficulties stemming 
from “levels of disagreement between 
our country and other countries and 
international organizations whose 
interests in our affairs are not always 
compatible with our own.” Christian 
warned his audience that, in the fed-
eration’s long march toward self-gov-
ernment, “one significant road block 
that stands out for us is our inability 
to yet wean ourselves from paternal 
relationships” (fsmpio 2015).
President Christian’s remarks car-
ried particular resonance in light of 
the attendees at the joint inauguration 
ceremony, including dignitaries from 
the United States, Australia, Japan, 
and the People’s Republic of China as 
well as representatives from a number 
of regional and international organiza-
tions with long-standing financial and 
technical programs of assistance for 
the FSM (Yap Congressional Delega-
tion Office 2015a). Notwithstanding 
such dire sentiments, the president 
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devoted much of his inaugural address 
to exhorting the people and govern-
ments of the FSM to work together 
“to achieve our nation’s goal: to give 
every citizen of the FSM an opportu-
nity—not just a promise—but a real 
opportunity to build a better life” 
(fsmpio 2015). In its first full year in 
office, the Christian administration led 
the FSM in an effort to achieve that 
goal, with varying degrees of success.
Financial grant assistance and 
visa-free entry and residency privileges 
in the United States are arguably the 
main benefits that the FSM receives 
under the amended compact, but in 
the period under review, those com-
ponents generated the greatest fric-
tion between the FSM and the United 
States. During the annual meeting 
of the Joint Economic Management 
Committee (jemco) on 1 September 
2015, the United States majority on 
the committee made cuts of millions 
of dollars to FSM requests for grant 
assistance in support of public-sector 
capacity building, private-sector 
development, and infrastructure 
development, including disapproving 
$50 million for infrastructure develop-
ment (fsmis, 21 Sept 2015). jemco’s 
cuts were not unprecedented, joining a 
long history of aggressively question-
ing and reducing grant requests from 
the FSM, including suspending the 
bulk of infrastructure grant funding 
since 2012. The FSM representa-
tives nevertheless sharply criticized 
the committee’s actions, noting that 
infrastructure development was key 
to achieving the dual objectives of 
“economic sustainability and bud-
getary self-reliance” under the com-
pact. The US representatives did not 
relent, arguing instead that the United 
States could not release the bulk of 
the requested infrastructure funding 
until the FSM produced an updated 
national Infrastructure Development 
Plan. The FSM eventually completed 
and submitted its plan (for fiscal 
years 2016–2025) to jemco in early 
October 2015, after years of consul-
tations and crafting (fsmis, 22 Oct 
2015). In January 2016, jemco voted 
to approve $119 million in infrastruc-
ture sector grants under the amended 
compact. Although the approvals 
were welcome news for the FSM, the 
administration groused that the grants 
were for infrastructure-related projects 
in the education and health sectors 
and not for other economic develop-
ment projects not directly related to 
education and health (fsmis, 17 Feb 
2016). jemco signaled that it would 
entertain the other infrastructure grant 
requests in future jemco meetings, in 
line with the newly completed FSM 
Infrastructure Development Plan, but 
that remains to be seen.
The friction between the FSM and 
the United States over jemco deci-
sions seemed to reach a boiling point 
as 2015 came to a close. In Novem-
ber 2015, prior to jemco approv-
ing $119 million in infrastructure 
grant funding for the FSM, Senator 
Isaac V Figir, chairman of the Ways 
and Means Committee of the FSM 
Congress, introduced Congressional 
Resolution (cr) 19-155 requesting 
that President Christian terminate the 
amended compact by 2018. The reso-
lution criticized the United States for 
“abus[ing] its majority” on jemco to 
take actions contrary to FSM interests 
and accused the United States of treat-
ing the compact as an “act of charity 
by the United States rather than a 
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treaty between two sovereign nations” 
(FSM Nineteenth Congress 2015–
2017a). In accordance with Title Four 
of the amended compact and relevant 
legislation in the FSM, the FSM can 
unilaterally terminate the amended 
compact, but only pursuant to a 
plebiscite in which at least 75 percent 
of voters from each of at least three of 
the four states of the federation vote in 
favor of termination (cofa 2003). 
cr 19-155 was the culmination 
of criticisms that Senator Figir had 
lodged against the FSM’s relationship 
with the United States for more than a 
decade, stretching back to the negotia-
tion of the amended compact from 
2001–2003, particularly with regard 
to the jemco process and what he 
perceived to be the process’s infringe-
ment on the sovereignty and dignity of 
the FSM (kp, 30 Nov 2015). Interest-
ingly, the recent resolution mirrored 
cr 17-61, introduced in 2011 in the 
FSM Congress by then-Senator Peter 
Christian—the lead negotiator of the 
FSM during the negotiations for the 
amended compact. cr 17-61 was 
never adopted by the FSM Congress. 
As of press time, the FSM Congress 
had not acted on cr 19-155.
Figir’s proposed resolution touched 
off a firestorm of reactions inside the 
FSM as well as abroad, including in 
Guam, Hawai‘i, and other parts of the 
United States with sizable residential 
populations of FSM citizens. Perhaps 
the sharpest flashpoints occurred in 
Guam, the US jurisdiction nearest 
to the FSM and therefore a major 
destination for FSM migrants seeking 
employment, education, and health 
care (pdn, 8 Feb 2016). In a survey of 
the FSM population residing in Guam 
that was conducted by an educator at 
the University of Guam and released 
in late February 2016, nearly all of 
the 180 respondents disapproved of 
terminating the amended compact, as 
requested by cr 19-155 (gdp, 29 Feb 
2016). Lawmakers in Guam seized on 
a passage in the resolution that cited 
a request by the US Senate Committee 
on Appropriations that the US Depart-
ment of Homeland Security “consider 
establishing a pre-screening process 
and requiring advanced permission for 
prospective travelers from the Feder-
ated States of Micronesia and other 
Freely Associated States to enter the 
United States” (FSM Nineteenth Con-
gress 2015–2017a). The Guam Gov-
ernment had made a similar request 
to the US federal government, in part 
to screen out FSM migrants who were 
convicted of crimes in the FSM, and 
in part to keep out unhealthy FSM 
migrants who would place significant 
strains on welfare services in Guam 
(pdn, 5 Dec 2015). cr 19-155 turned 
into a hot-button political issue in 
Guam, with Guam Senator Frank Blas 
Jr, pressing Congresswoman Madeline 
Bordallo—Guam’s representative in 
the US Congress—to specify her stance 
on the resolution and the significant 
impact its adoption would likely 
have on Guam (kuam, 14 Dec 2015). 
Bordallo recalled her recent legislation 
introduced in the US Congress allocat-
ing increased financial assistance from 
the US federal government to Guam 
and other US jurisdictions impacted 
by the influx of FSM migrants, par-
ticularly migrants that utilize welfare 
services in those jurisdictions. Guam 
seemed to be uniquely positioned 
to receive any such additional assis-
tance—for one, more than half of 
the homeless population in Guam at 
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the beginning of 2016 was from the 
FSM, especially Chuuk (gdp 8 June 
2016). Indeed, Guam Governor Eddie 
Calvo had previously warned the US 
federal government—particularly the 
Department of the Interior, which has 
immediate jurisdiction over Guam 
and the Freely Associated States (fas) 
of FSM, Republic of the Marshall 
Islands, and Republic of Palau—that 
Guam had reached a “breaking point” 
in providing government services to 
migrants from the FSM and other fas, 
including $50 million per year for the 
education of the children of migrants 
from the fas (pdn, 3 July 2015).
In response to strong expressions 
of bewilderment and disapproval by 
many FSM citizens who resided in 
the United States and feared that their 
visa-free immigration privileges in the 
United States would be revoked on 
termination of the amended compact, 
members of the Christian administra-
tion conducted a forum in Guam in 
February 2016 to explain cr 19-155 
and discuss its possible ramifications. 
The Christian administration was 
represented by, among others, Lorin S 
Roberts, the FSM secretary of foreign 
affairs; Joses Gallen, the FSM attorney 
general; Leo Falcam Jr, chief of staff 
for President Christian; and Asterio 
Takesy, the former FSM ambassador 
to the United States. While Secretary 
Roberts assured the forum attendees 
that the congressional resolution was 
only a “draft” on which no action had 
been taken, Chief Falcam warned that 
the effects of terminating the amended 
compact would be “fairly far reaching, 
especially when it comes to immi-
gration and those programs [FSM] 
citizens can take advantage of when 
they’re living abroad in the United 
States or its territories.” Ambassador 
Takesy reminded the attendees that the 
financial provisions of the amended 
compact are already scheduled to 
expire in 2023, but even with advance 
notice of that predetermined termina-
tion date, the FSM stood to face an 
annual fiscal shortfall of about 30 to 
40 percent compared to current fund-
ing levels; terminating the amended 
compact prior to 2023 would likely 
place the FSM in an even deeper fiscal 
hole (kuam, 22 Feb 2016). 
With the prospect of the federa-
tion prematurely disassociating itself 
from the United States, the Christian 
administration stepped up its efforts 
to secure financial, technical, and 
programmatic assistance and invest-
ments from foreign entities, including 
other countries. Vice President George 
led an FSM delegation in September 
2015 to the Second India Forum for 
Pacific Islands Cooperation, where 
the government of India presented 
a donation of $200,000 to the FSM 
Department of Resources and Devel-
opment for the “FSM Integrated 
Agriculture Census” (fsmis, 14 Sept 
2015). In November 2015, Vice 
President George received executives 
from Able Overseas  Reinsurance 
Company, a Japanese entity that is one 
of several captive insurance companies 
operating in the FSM and generat-
ing significant revenues for the FSM 
(fsmis, 25 Nov 2015). The executives 
presented a $10,000 donation to Vice 
President George to aid FSM recovery 
efforts from the devastating impacts of 
Typhoon Maysak in Chuuk and Yap. 
Beginning in January 2016, in accor-
dance with an air services agreement 
with the FSM, Nauru Airlines began 
“same plane” services from Nauru to 
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Kosrae, Pohnpei, and Chuuk via Kiri-
bati and the Marshall Islands (kp, 29 
Dec 2015), thus breaking the effective 
monopoly that United Airlines had 
had on commercial flight services in 
the FSM. And, in June 2016, the FSM 
joined other Pacific Island countries 
in negotiating a Pacific Agreement on 
Closer Economic Relations (pacer-
Plus) with Australia and New Zealand 
in Nadi, Fiji. If adopted and imple-
mented, pacer-Plus will formalize 
several types of financial and techni-
cal assistance that Australia and New 
Zealand will provide Pacific Island 
countries for trade-related purposes, 
include training in customs, confor-
mity assessment, and the implementa-
tion of tariff commitments (fsmis, 23 
June 2016). Negotiations for pacer-
Plus were scheduled to conclude by 
the end of 2016.
By far the largest non–compact-
related donor source for the FSM 
during the current period was the 
government of the People’s Republic 
of China. On 18 September 2015, 
in a signing ceremony attended by 
President Christian, Vice President 
George, and other key members of the 
Christian administration, the Chinese 
government formally turned over 
grant assistance of just over $10 mil-
lion to the FSM national government, 
which was earmarked for the purchase 
of more than a dozen vehicles and 
various other projects. The amount 
was the largest-ever grant assistance 
from China to the FSM, prompting 
President Christian to characterize 
the grant as a “sign of friendship and 
cooperation between the two coun-
tries” and a “good gesture of generos-
ity” (fsmis, 29 Sept 2015). On 21 
December 2015, China donated medi-
cal equipment and supplies worth over 
$130,000 to the Pohnpei State Depart-
ment of Health Services in a signing 
ceremony in which the FSM was 
represented by Secretary Robert (kp, 
21 Dec 2015). On 25 January 2016, 
a minister-led delegation from China 
participated in the 1st China-FSM 
Economic and Trade Commission in 
Pohnpei, wherein representatives from 
China and the FSM signed a memo-
randum of understanding regarding 
trade and other economic matters of 
mutual interest (fsmis, 5 Feb 2016). 
In March 2016, the ambassador of 
China to the FSM notified President 
Christian of a forthcoming support 
package from China worth approxi-
mately $1.5 million to aid the FSM in 
its efforts to address drought condi-
tions caused by El Niño; the support 
package would include seawater-desal-
ination equipment, portable genera-
tors, and water storage tanks, marking 
the largest-ever grant assistance from 
China to the FSM for disaster-relief 
efforts (fsmis, 23 March 2016). And, 
also in March 2016, during a meet-
ing requested by organizers of the 
2018 Micronesian Games (to be held 
in Yap) to solicit donor assistance for 
the games and arranged by the FSM 
national government, the Embassy 
of China to the FSM essentially 
promised the organizers unrestricted 
funds, in contrast to the relatively 
parsimonious responses of the embas-
sies of Japan and Australia and the 
non-participation of the US Embassy 
(abc, 2 June 2016). China’s growing 
influence in the FSM was evident, with 
China wielding economic largesse to 
strengthen its foothold in the FSM as 
the United States continues its pivot to 
Asia under the Obama administration.
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While securing donations and 
investments from the international 
community, the FSM national gov-
ernment took significant strides in 
reaping economic benefits from the 
exploitation of a natural resource 
that fell under its jurisdiction: tuna 
fish stocks. The FSM convened a 
four-day National Fisheries Seminar 
in late May 2016 that proclaimed, in 
no uncertain terms, that “fish is our 
blue gold”—a clear reference to the 
lucrative annual revenues generated by 
the sale of fishing licenses by the FSM 
primarily to foreign fishing operators 
(FSM Updates, 24 May 2016). The 
seminar highlighted the intent of the 
FSM to generate up to $85 million in 
annual fishing revenues in the near 
future, based on the sale of so-called 
fishing days by the FSM to fishing 
operators pursuant to the Vessel Day 
Scheme of the Nauru Agreement—a 
regional arrangement of eight par-
ties (including the FSM) that, among 
other things, sets an overall number of 
fishing days for tuna in the maritime 
jurisdictions of its parties, establishes 
a minimum rate to be charged by 
the parties for each fishing day, and 
apportions the fishing days among 
the parties for eventual sale to fish-
ing operators (kp, 15 Nov 2015). The 
Vessel Day Scheme aims to generate 
maximum revenues for Pacific Island 
countries while maintaining adequate 
conservation levels for the skipjack 
and bigeye tuna populations in their 
waters. In 2014, the sale of fishing 
days generated nearly $50 million 
in revenue for the FSM, which was 
almost 40 percent of the total govern-
ment revenues that year. The FSM 
aimed to ensure that such revenues 
would be utilized to maximize eco-
nomic development, especially as the 
scheduled termination of the financial 
provisions of the amended compact 
in 2023 approaches. After decades 
of fitful management of its fisher-
ies, the FSM at last seems poised to 
obtain maximum value for its natural 
resources.
The success of the FSM and other 
parties to the Nauru Agreement in 
generating outsize revenues for their 
fishing days ran into an unexpected 
snag when, in November 2015, the 
United States indicated that it would 
likely renege on an agreement it signed 
in August 2015 with the seventeen 
Pacific Island parties to the Pacific 
Tuna Treaty (including the parties to 
the Nauru Agreement), whereby the 
United States would pay approxi-
mately $90 million to the parties for 
a certain number of fishing days for 
US fishing operators (kp, 1 Dec 2015). 
Specifically, the United States wanted 
to return nearly 2,000 of the 6,250 
fishing days it had originally commit-
ted to purchase; the returned fishing 
days were worth approximately $23 
million (Pacific Islands Forum Fisher-
ies Agency 2015). With the fishing 
season scheduled to commence on 1 
January 2016, and with the US opera-
tors failing to make their first-quarter 
payments by then, the FSM and other 
Pacific Island parties refused to issue 
fishing licenses to US operators in 
time for the opening of the fishing 
season, thus shutting out the US tuna 
fleet from the tuna-rich waters of the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean—
the world’s largest tuna fishery—for 
the first time in three decades (Yahoo! 
News 2016). Ultimately, in March 
2016, after extensive negotiations 
between the United States and the 
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Pacific Island parties to the Pacific 
Tuna Treaty, the Pacific delegations 
agreed to the reduction in fishing 
days proposed by the United States in 
November 2015 and entered into a 
new agreement with the United States 
that locked in payments from the 
United States for multiple years (rnz 
2016).
As the FSM pursued efforts to 
secure the long-term sustainable use 
of its tuna resources, it also pushed 
the international community to adopt 
various measures to safeguard natural 
environments and their resources writ 
large, particularly from the ravages of 
climate change. At the 15th Microne-
sian Presidents’ Summit held 14–15 
July 2015 in Majuro, Republic of the 
Marshall Islands (RMI), President 
Christian joined his counterparts 
from RMI and the Republic of Palau 
in exchanging views and information 
on a wide range of issues, including 
climate change, sea transportation, 
fiber optic cable projects, maritime 
boundary delimitations, and fisher-
ies surveillance operations (fsmis, 23 
July 2015). Although the summit was 
Christian’s first as FSM president, he 
had been instrumental in initiating the 
summit process nearly two decades 
earlier. Drawing on his familiarity 
with the summit process as well as 
his personal rapport with his fellow 
presidents, President Christian secured 
their agreement to support a push by 
the FSM for an amendment to the 
Montreal Protocol to phase down the 
production and use of hydrofluoro-
carbons (hfcs), an initiative that the 
FSM had been championing for the 
better part of the decade. hfcs—pri-
marily coolants used in refrigerators 
and air conditioners—are greenhouse 
gases that are more potent than 
 carbon dioxide when released into the 
 atmosphere and whose elimination 
will likely prevent up to 0.5 degree 
Celsius of average global warming by 
the end of the current century (igsd 
2016). After years of tough negotia-
tions, state parties to the Montreal 
Protocol were scheduled to adopt an 
hfc phase-down amendment in Octo-
ber 2016, thanks in part to efforts by 
the FSM and many other small island 
developing states.
In December 2015, President Chris-
tian led a sizable delegation from the 
FSM to Paris for the 21st Conference 
of the Parties (cop21) to the United 
Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (unfccc). The 
unfccc states parties negotiated and 
adopted the Paris Agreement, the first 
universally applicable international 
agreement to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. While at cop21, President 
Christian delivered an address that 
featured a story about a breadfruit 
tree overhanging a public roadway 
and damaging passing vehicles. 
According to the story, the owner of 
the breadfruit tree and the owner of 
a car damaged by falling breadfruit 
discussed the need to trim or remove 
the breadfruit tree as well as compen-
sate the car owner for damage to his 
vehicle (kp, 16 Dec 2015). The story—
being a clear reference to the historical 
responsibility of developed countries 
for the harmful effects of greenhouse 
gas emissions as well as the necessity 
of compensating developing countries 
like the FSM for the loss and damage 
they suffered due to climate change—
mirrored the general tenor of the nego-
tiations during cop21, with developed 
countries and a number of major-emit-
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ter developing countries resisting the 
assumption of new and burdensome 
obligations under the Paris Agreement, 
and with developing countries—par-
ticularly small island developing states 
and the least developed countries—
pushing hard for drastic emissions 
reductions, robust climate financial 
assistance, and compensation and 
liability for irreversible coastal erosion 
and other forms of loss and damage 
due to climate change. In the last few 
days of cop21, with many key conten-
tious issues of the Paris Agreement 
still unresolved, the FSM joined nearly 
one hundred unfccc states parties in 
unveiling the so-called “High Ambi-
tion Coalition,” which included the 
United States and the European Union 
(Mathiesen and Harvey 2015). The 
coalition—which had coalesced over 
a year of secret talks—played a key 
role in securing a Paris Agreement that 
would, among other things, be legally 
binding, anchor a standalone mecha-
nism for loss and damage, and—in 
a surprise to many observers of the 
years-long negotiations for the Paris 
Agreement—commit states parties 
to pursue efforts to limit the global 
average temperature increase to 1.5 
degrees Celsius above preindustrial 
levels (unfccc 2015). The 1.5-degrees 
target was a major goal of the FSM 
and other small island developing 
states for the Paris Agreement, in light 
of the cataclysmic consequences posed 
by a greater-than-1.5-degree tempera-
ture rise, including coastal inundation 
from sea-level rise and severe weather 
events. On 22 April 2016, signaling 
the support of the FSM for the Paris 
Agreement, President Christian joined 
representatives from 174 other coun-
tries in signing the Paris Agreement at 
the UN headquarters in New York—
the largest-ever single-day signing of 
an international instrument (fsmis, 
27 April 2016).
In a sign of the seriousness with 
which the FSM views climate change, 
Speaker Wesley S Simina of the FSM 
Congress established a Special Com-
mittee on Climate Change just prior 
to cop21, pursuant to a congressional 
resolution (19-139) requesting the 
committee’s establishment (FSM Nine-
teenth Congress 2015–2017a). Several 
members of the FSM Congress were 
part of the FSM delegation at cop21, 
including Speaker Simina and Senator 
Figir, the chairman of the newly estab-
lished committee (Yap Congressional 
Delegation Office 2015b). The estab-
lishment of the committee indicated 
a desire by Congress to become more 
involved in the FSM’s engagement 
with climate change issues, including 
on the international stage. Indeed, 
during the Fourth Regular Session of 
the FSM Congress in May 2016, Sena-
tor Figir questioned why the Christian 
administration had not yet transmit-
ted the Paris Agreement to the FSM 
Congress for ratification more than a 
month after President Christian signed 
the Paris Agreement (Congress News 
2016). Whether the involvement of 
Congress in climate change matters 
would complement rather than hinder 
the efforts of the executive branch 
remains to be seen.
Perhaps as a preview of the inter-
actions between the FSM Congress 
and the executive branch on climate 
change matters, the national gov-
ernment engaged in a controversial 
back-and-forth in response to El Niño, 
a cyclical weather phenomenon that 
severely reduced rainfall and trig-
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gered drought conditions in the FSM 
and many other parts of the world 
for much of the period under review. 
This El Niño was one of the strongest 
in decades, generating intense storms, 
bleaching coral reef systems, and driv-
ing drought conditions throughout 
much of the world (Thompson 2016). 
In early February 2016, Pohnpei—
normally one of the wettest places in 
the world—suffered several days of 
water outages that were blamed on El 
Niño–caused drought conditions (kp, 
11 Feb 2016). Similar drought condi-
tions were reported in Chuuk and 
Yap, particularly their outer islands.
In response to the escalating nation-
wide drought conditions, President 
Christian signed a Presidential Emer-
gency Declaration on 18 February 
2016. The declaration, among other 
things, established a National Emer-
gency Task Force to coordinate with 
state governments on relief efforts, 
activated a Disaster Relief Fund, 
and redirected $200,000 in previ-
ously appropriated funds into that 
fund (fsmpio 2016). However, on 
29 February 2016, the FSM Congress 
unanimously adopted Congressional 
Resolution 19-192 (FSM Nineteenth 
Congress 2015–2017a), revoking the 
emergency declaration. According 
to the text of the resolution as well 
as the attached report (19-08) of the 
Special Committee to Wait on the 
President (which raised the issue of the 
declaration to the Christian admin-
istration) (FSM Nineteenth Congress 
2015–2017b), Congress chose to 
revoke the declaration because it was 
signed before any of the governors of 
the four states of the federation had 
made their own emergency declara-
tions in relation to El Niño, and 
Congress preferred to defer to state 
government leadership in emergency 
relief efforts conducted as part of a 
coordinated national response (mv, 4 
March 2016). However, some of the 
funds diverted into the Disaster Relief 
Fund by the Presidential Emergency 
Declaration were originally appropri-
ated as travel funds for Congress. It 
was plausible that the revocation by 
Congress was motivated at least in 
part by the reallocation of congres-
sional travel funds—an act that the 
president had the legal authority to do 
pursuant to his powers to issue and 
implement emergency declarations. In 
any case, shortly after the revocation, 
the governors of the four states made 
their respective emergency declara-
tions, citing severe drought conditions, 
serious crop damage, and the sharp 
increase of drought-related disease, 
among other effects of El Niño (pdn, 
14 April 2016). Whether the spat 
between Congress and the executive 
branch undermined relief efforts in the 
FSM—even temporarily—was a very 
real possibility.
In his inaugural address, President 
Christian expressed an evocative 
vision of proper governance for his 
administration, one that recognized 
the imperative of economic devel-
opment while appreciating various 
roadblocks in that mission, including 
self-inflicted ones. With the ten-
sions between the various levels of 
government in the FSM threatening 
coordinated national responses to 
pressing national and local issues, and 
with the continuation of the politi-
cal, economic, and legal association 
between the FSM and the United 
States increasingly under fire, the 
period under review closed with the 
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FSM reassessing its historical ties to 
its natural environment and resources, 
its development prerogatives, and the 
United States, and preparing for a not-
too-distant future in which it will no 
longer be able to rely on the amended 
compact to finance the bulk of its 
annual operations and development 
needs. Unity in the federation and 
political dexterity will be critical to 
navigating those rough waters, just as 
the ancestors of the FSM people relied 
on unity and specialized knowledge 
to navigate the expanse of the Pacific 
Ocean and settle its far-flung isles. 
Will such ancient history bear out, or 
will contentious recent history trump 
such progress?
clement yow mulalap
The opinions expressed in this 
review are those of the author and do 
not necessarily reflect the official views 
of the government of the  Federated 
States of Micronesia.
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Guam 
The year ended on a high note in 
Guam, as the island had the honor 
of hosting the 12th Festival of Pacific 
Arts (FestPac), 22 May–4 June 2016. 
FestPac, sponsored by the Secretariat 
of the Pacific Community, is often 
called “the cultural Olympics of the 
Pacific.” Close to thirty Island nations 
come together to share their arts 
and culture with each other and the 
rest of the world. More than 2,700 
delegates made their way to Guam for 
the thirteen-day event, which showed 
the breadth of cultural diversity of the 
Pacific and the various ways in which 
Pacific peoples are perpetuating and 
reinvigorating their heritages.
FestPac experienced early logisti-
cal issues. At the opening ceremony, 
delegates were forced to stand for 
hours without adequate access to food 
and water, and problems with meal 
vouchers, transportation, and accom-
modations also marred the event (pdn, 
23 May 2016). These issues were soon 
eclipsed by the momentousness of the 
occasion, as FestPac was filled with a 
multitude of activities including per-
formances, cultural demonstrations, 
lectures, creative readings, academic 
conferences, and film screenings. 
The first-ever Indigenous Language 
Conference at FestPac offered presen-
tations and networking opportunities 
for scholars and community activists 
across the Pacific who were seeking 
to revitalize or preserve their native 
languages (kuam, 27 May 2016). 
The relationship between Cha-
morros and FestPac has sometimes 
been contentious. As Chamorros are 
the people of the Pacific who have 
experienced the longest history of 
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colonization, they are often perceived 
in the wider Pacific as having no 
culture. Decades of Chamorro par-
ticipation in FestPac and exposure 
to those critiques of their cultural 
identity have pushed Chamorros to 
learn more about themselves as an 
indigenous people and to re-create 
certain traditional arts, most notably 
dancing (pdn, 23 April 2015). The 
cultural performance groups På'a 
Taotao Tåno' and I Fanlalai'an were 
both formed as attempts to reestablish 
Chamorro traditional dance or chant, 
and they seized on FestPac as their 
chance to showcase their culture to the 
rest of the Pacific. 
Guam has been without a national 
museum for several decades, and it 
was hoped that one would be open in 
time for FestPac. Some facilities were 
finished and able to be used for Fest-
Pac activities, but the majority of the 
Guam Museum remains unfinished. 
Although it was originally scheduled 
for completion in 2014, delays due to 
mismanagement and weather pushed 
the projected completion date to 
spring 2017 (pdn, 31 March 2016). 
In May 2016, Governor Eddie Calvo 
signed an executive order naming the 
museum after the late Senator Anto-
nio Manibusan Palomo, a Chamorro 
author and former director of the 
museum (gdp, 4 May 2016). 
During the FestPac closing 
 ceremony, a group of a dozen Guam 
delegates unfurled two banners embla-
zoned with the words “Decolonize 
Oceania” and “Free Guåhan.” Kisha 
Borja-Quichocho-Calvo, a professor 
at the University of Guam and one of 
the demonstrators, noted the state-
ment was necessary “to demonstrate 
that FestPac is not just an event which 
highlights the beautiful cultural facets 
of our Pacific communities. . . . It is 
also an event which should remind us 
of the historical and political struggles 
of our people . . . and the beauty in 
our ability to survive hundreds of 
years of colonialism” (pdn, 9 June 
2016). Five of the islands participating 
in FestPac are formally listed by the 
United Nations as “Non-Self-Govern-
ing-Territories,” and several others 
exist in neocolonial relationships with-
out recognition (pdn, 18 July 2016).
While the demonstration was 
meant to provoke a response from the 
wider community of the Pacific, it was 
also aimed at Governor Calvo, who 
had, months before, taken an aggres-
sive position on changing Guam’s 
 political status but did not appear 
to be  carrying out his stated goals. 
In March 2016, during his State of 
the Island Address, Calvo made the 
bold move of declaring his intention 
to hold a  political status plebiscite 
in November. In this non-binding 
vote, the Chamorro people of Guam 
would select between free associa-
tion, independence, and statehood for 
Guam’s future political status, and the 
results would be submitted to the US 
government. In his speech, he referred 
to nearly four hundred years of 
 colonization as being long enough and 
said the time was ripe for the people 
of Guam to seize their long-deferred 
dream of self-determination (Calvo 
2016). 
Per existing local law, the Commis-
sion on Decolonization, of which the 
governor is chairman, is responsible 
for setting the date of any plebiscite, 
once it determines that the public 
is adequately prepared and that 70 
percent of those eligible to vote are 
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 registered. Calvo proposed instead 
using a public referendum process 
from the US Organic Act, which 
allows any private citizen to put forth 
any issue to the entire island commu-
nity in the form of a vote (pdn, 2 April 
2016). A collection of Chamorro 
rights groups formally informed Calvo 
they found his plan reckless, as the 
public referendum would take place 
within too short a time period, with 
no educational materials created or 
outreach infrastructure in place. His 
proposed referendum would violate 
both local and international law, as it 
would open the decolonization vote 
to the general public; the plebiscite 
is legally reserved only for “native 
inhabitants,” those who are the direct 
inheritors of the legacy of Guam’s 
colonization (pdn, 5 April 2016). 
In April, Calvo met with the Com-
mission on Decolonization to discuss 
his plans. While the commission was 
sympathetic to Calvo’s desire to move 
ahead on the issue, they lamented the 
fact that the governor, despite being 
the chairman of the commission, had 
not attended a meeting in four years. 
Calvo proposed that his office conduct 
an aggressive, three-month educational 
campaign. The commission would 
meet again in July, and if—through a 
series of public meetings, social media 
marketing, and distribution of educa-
tional materials—a significant amount 
of education had taken place, then a 
plebiscite would be set for November 
(kuam, 6 April 2016). The July meet-
ing was pushed back to August, as 
several members of the commission, 
from both Democratic and Republi-
can parties, were off island attending 
the national party conventions in the 
United States. 
Residents of Guam, whether 
indigenous or not, US citizens or not, 
are all denied the right to vote for US 
president, denied representation in the 
electoral college, and denied voting 
representation in the US Congress. The 
party conventions represent the only 
national political participation open to 
the people of the US territories (Gallo 
2016). Madeleine Bordallo, Guam’s 
nonvoting delegate to Congress, 
highlighted the island’s liminal status 
at the Democratic National Conven-
tion in Philadelphia: “Madame chair, 
hafa adai from the island of Guam—a 
remarkably diverse community and 
the homeland of the Chamorro people. 
We have traveled over 8,000 miles and 
through nine time zones, to cast our 
only vote for the president and vice 
president. We want a president who is 
sensitive to our needs . . . a president 
that supports our rights for full self-
determination and self-governance as 
ratified in the Democratic platform” 
(gdp, 3 Aug 2016). 
With the conventions finished, the 
Commission on Decolonization met 
in August. The Governor’s Office had 
held no public meetings and con-
ducted no surveys since April, and so 
the governor withdrew his proposal 
for a November plebiscite (gdp, 
25 Aug 2016). 
Governor Calvo’s rationale for 
pushing ahead with a plebiscite was in 
part because colonialism inhibits the 
island and its leaders from any input 
into the actions of the US military in 
its area. US plans to transfer rela-
tively large numbers of marines from 
Okinawa to Guam have been contro-
versial to the public, especially in 2009 
when the US Department of Defense’s 
Draft Environmental Impact Statement 
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was first released. Approximately 
6,000 military personnel and 6,000 
dependents are currently stationed 
on Guam. The military already uses 
more than 28 percent of the island as 
fortified and highly controlled bases. 
The US military now proposes adding 
5,000 marines and 1,300 dependents 
by 2022 and requiring the construc-
tion of housing and a live-fire train-
ing range near an ancient village, 
Litekyan, that is culturally significant 
to Chamorros (pdn, 1 Sept 2015). 
After years of delay, in October 
2015 the US Congress authorized the 
first release of funds for its plans in 
Guam, more than $300 million for 
infrastructure projects primarily con-
nected to improving the wastewater 
facilities (pdn, 4 Dec 2015). The envi-
ronmental activist group Our Islands 
Are Sacred wrote to Governor Calvo 
expressing concern over potential 
negative impacts; as group member 
Moñeka de Oro put it: “regardless of 
whether this is good for Guam or bad 
for Guam . . . the biggest (problem) 
is we never were really asked if this is 
something that we wanted” (pdn, 22 
Sept 2016). Calvo met with represen-
tatives of Our Islands Are Sacred, later 
saying that they had convinced him of 
the need for self-determination, espe-
cially prior to any further increases in 
the US military presence (State of the 
Island Address 2016). 
Guam is oftentimes referred to 
as the “tip of the spear” by local 
politicians, military commanders, 
and national media, as its geographic 
location makes it key to US strategic 
interests in the Asia-Pacific region 
(Fifield 2016). Guam is beset by 
rumors of wars and a regular shuf-
fling of military assets. Throughout 
the year, Guam found itself men-
tioned regularly amid saber rattling 
from China and North Korea. In 
May 2016, China revealed a missile 
dubbed “the Guam Killer,” capable of 
striking Guam (pdn, 13 May 2016). 
North Korea appears to be developing 
intermediate-range Musudan missiles, 
which it threatens would be capable 
of striking US bases in Guam (gdp, 
24 June 2016). 
China is threatening to increase its 
bomber and fighter flights in the con-
tested South China Sea, so the United 
States is adding to its own aircraft 
firepower in the region. For the first 
time in a decade, the United States sta-
tioned b-1b bombers on Guam (pdn, 
29 July 2016). In May 2016, a b-52h 
bomber crashed at Andersen Air Force 
Base in Guam, but all seven of the 
crew survived (pdn, 20 May 2016). 
With North Korea regularly conduct-
ing missile tests as shows of force, a 
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
(thaad) mission was established on 
Guam in 2013. South Koreans visited 
Guam’s thaad mission in July 2016 
to assess environmental risks, as the 
United States plans to install a similar 
mission in South Korea in 2017 (pdn, 
19 July 2016). 
US military spending is one pillar 
of Guam’s economy; tourism, another 
pillar, experienced a record-breaking 
year. More tourists visited Guam in 
2015 than in any other year in the 
island’s history: 1,409,033 tourists 
put 2015 well above Guam’s previous 
record of 1,381,513 in 1997 (Pacific 
News Center, 15 Jan 2015). The 
Guam Visitors Bureau (gvb) noted 
that 2016 could easily break this 
record, however, with Guam hosting 
several large-scale events, most nota-
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bly FestPac and the annual summit of 
the Pacific Asia Travel Association.
Japanese tourists are overwhelm-
ingly the largest market for Guam 
tourism; however, in 2015, their 
numbers declined by 4.7 percent, 
with other markets performing above 
expectations. A record was set in 2015 
for highest number of South Korean 
tourists—427,900—a 38.9 percent 
increase from 2014. Chinese tourists 
also experienced a significant increase 
to 23,698, a 45.6 percent increase 
from 2014. Mark Baldyga of the gvb 
noted that the banner performance 
of the tourism sector in 2015 and 
the record-setting monthly arrival 
numbers in the first half of 2016 all 
indicate that the island is on track to 
reach the goal of two million tourists 
a year in 2020, set by Governor Calvo 
in 2014 (gdp, 28 April 2016). Despite 
these increases, there is skepticism 
that Guam can reach that goal, as 
the island’s colonial status prevents 
it from controlling its own immigra-
tion and visa system. China’s out-
bound tourist market is massive and 
relatively close to Guam, but tensions 
with the United States make it difficult 
for Chinese citizens to obtain visas to 
visit Guam. Local officials have lob-
bied for decades in Washington dc for 
a Guam-only China visa waiver, with 
no success (pdn, 27 April 2016). 
The steady increases in tourism 
have been a result of new investment 
in the island, with new hotels such 
as the first luxury resort to open on 
Guam in over fifteen years, the Dusit 
Thani, and also the increase in flights 
to Guam by carriers around Asia (pdn, 
6 July 2015). Not all new develop-
ment, however, has been celebrated 
by the local community. In December 
2015, plans were announced to build 
two residential towers, comprising 
more than three hundred condo units, 
on Pågo Bay, the site of an ancient 
Chamorro village and already a rural 
residential area for several hundred 
people (pdn, 24 Dec 2015). Although 
local media and leaders initially 
celebrated this development, called 
the Pågo Bay Marina Resort, from 
a Chinese group, Guam Wangfang 
Construction Ltd, public sentiment 
soon soured. Concerned residents 
referred to the plans in public meet-
ings as a “monstrosity” that could 
incur environmental damage. More 
than one hundred citizens attended 
a public hearing in January 2016, 
and all those testifying opposed the 
development, citing concerns with 
infrastructure, traffic, alteration of the 
currently residential/forested land-
scape, and environmental degradation 
(pdn, 10 Jan 2016). 
Despite loud public outcry, the con-
struction was approved by the Guam 
Land Use Commission. Residents 
opposed to the development formed 
the group Save Southern Guam, which 
filed petitions for judicial review and 
injunctive relief in May 2016 (kuam, 
6 June 2016). Save Southern Guam 
proposed legislative measures to 
allow for more community oversight 
in the future, including requiring the 
approval of municipal planning coun-
cils for proposed projects under review 
by the Guam Land Use Commission. 
Several Guam senators have taken up 
this cause as well. 
One possible economic venue for 
Guam, though mired in regulatory 
issues for the past year, is medical 
marijuana. Guam residents voted 
to legalize medical marijuana in 
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November 2014, with the Joaquin 
KC Concepcion II Compassionate 
Cannabis Act. The initial regulations 
were developed by the Guam Depart-
ment of Public Health and released for 
public comment in July 2015 (pdn, 
18 July 2015). According to feedback 
received, the public noted that the 
regulations did not allow for home 
growing, were too strict, and outlined 
steep fees for growers and distribu-
tors (gdp, 3 July 2016). In July 2016, 
Senator Tina Muña Barnes proposed 
bills to create a climate for the use 
of medical marijuana that would not 
lead to conflicts with existing rules. In 
August, her bills lapsed into law (gdp, 
8 Aug 2016). 
The past year saw a rift in one of 
the most powerful social and cultural 
institutions on the island, the Catho-
lic Church. A new group called the 
Neocatechumenal Way drew concern 
as it seemed to receive preferential 
treatment from Archbishop Anthony 
Apuron. There were frequent public 
protests over the archbishop’s treat-
ment of priests critical of the group 
and his alleged gift of over $20 million 
in Church assets to “the Way” (pdn, 
19 Aug 2016). In June 2016, Apuron 
was placed on leave by Pope Francis 
after several men came forward claim-
ing that Apuron had sexually abused 
them when they were children. Savio 
Hon Tai-Fai of Hong Kong is now the 
acting archbishop (Scammell 2016). 
Guam Regional Medical City, a 
new 130-bed private hospital opened 
on Guam in July 2015, offering highly 
specialized services and equipment for 
conditions including heart attacks, 
diabetes, strokes, and cancer (gdp, 
4 July 2016). The hospital has two 
hyperbaric chambers, used to hasten 
the healing of wounds. Guam’s public 
hospital has been plagued by budget 
overruns and other scandals. Oper-
ating the new hospital has proven 
 difficult, as work visas for skilled 
labor have been denied or delayed, 
forcing the pediatric unit to shut 
down for three weeks (kuam, 10 May 
2016). 
In sports, Guam made history with 
its first Asian Rugby Championship 
in a decade with a win over China in 
the Division 3 East. This earns Guam’s 
team a promotion to Division 2 status; 
Guam had been ranked in Division 3 
since joining the Asian Rugby Foot-
ball League in 2004 (Guam Sports 
Network, 11 June 2015). Guam’s 
paddling clubs Taotao Galaide and 
Tátasi earned spots at Va‘a World 
Sprints in Australia, described as “the 
Olympics for paddling” by coach 
Josh Duenas (pdn, 26 March 2016). 
Guam made its eighth overall appear-
ance at the summer Olympics when it 
sent five  athletes to the 2016 Olympic 
Games held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 
Benjamin Schulte and Pilar Shimizu 
competed in 100-meter breaststroke 
events, Regine Tugade and Joshua 
Ilustre in track and field, and Peter 
Lombard in mountain biking (Guam 
Sports Network, 17 June 2016). 
In September 2015, the island 
mourned the passing of author Jose 
Mata Torres, who died at the age of 
eighty-eight. In the final year of his 
life, Torres published his memoir, 
Massacre at Atåte, in which he dis-
cussed his participation in an uprising 
against Japanese forces in his village 
of Malesso' during the closing days of 
World War II in Guam (pdn, 30 Sept 
2015). His account is one of the few 
records of this scarcely documented 
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portion of recent Guam history. In 
response to systematic massacres being 
conducted by the Japanese, a group 
of men under the leadership of Jose 
“Tonko” Reyes rose up to attack their 
captors and liberate themselves. 
In February 2016, the island 
mourned a pioneer in the movement 
to preserve and revitalize the Cha-
morro language when Dr Bernadita 
Camacho-Dungca passed away at 
the age of seventy-five. She was the 
first and only Chamorro thus far to 
earn a PhD in linguistics, a coauthor 
of the Chamorro-English Dictionary, 
and a leader in developing the first 
classroom courses for Chamorro. She 
guided multiple generations of Cha-
morro-language instructors. She was 
also the author of the “Inifresi,” the 
Guam pledge, which is recited each 
day by tens of thousands of Guam 
public-school children (gdp, 24 Feb 
2016). 
In November 2014, Governor 
Calvo launched his “Imagine Guam” 
initiative, meant to be an extended 
community-wide conversation on 
what Guam could be in 2065 (pdn, 10 
July 2015). The Speaker of the Guam 
Legislature, Judith Won Pat, had told 
the Governor’s Office in July 2015 
that its initial vision was too focused 
on the economic elite and did not have 
enough representation from cultural, 
educational, and health sectors (pdn, 
17 July 2015). The Governor’s Office 
expanded the roster of participants 
to more than a hundred, divided into 
seventeen discussion teams. 
Over the course of three conven-
tions, the Imagine Guam attendees 
focused on elaborating the possibilities 
for Guam in land, capital improve-
ments, tax-code revision, government, 
society, workforce, career paths, and 
education. The discussions were ham-
pered in many ways, however, due to 
the island’s political status and uncer-
tainty over whether self-determination 
could be possible. In a January 2016 
speech, the governor highlighted the 
need for a decolonized outlook when 
looking to the future: “Imagine Guam 
is—at its heart—self-determination. 
We are determining the course we 
will take. We do so because of our 
love of Guam and the confidence that 
is growing that we can take control. 
And why should we be so confident in 
this modern era, when we’ve spent so 
much time believing we were inferior 
in this vast world? The rest of our 
country pushes against the American 
borders of the Pacific. But we’re at the 
world’s economic frontier. It’s not sim-
ply a magnet for industry, but for the 
larger, more brilliant, and more attrac-
tive fruits of life that breed sustainable 
futures” (pdn, 30 Jan 2016). 
michael lujan bevacqua
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Marshall Islands
For the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands (RMI), the period under review 
saw the passing of several traditional 
and political leaders and distinguished 
community members. Most notable 
was the death of Iroojḷapḷap (Para-
mount Chief), Senator, and former 
President Jurelang Zedkaia, who 
suffered a fatal heart attack in Octo-
ber 2015. In addition to overseeing 
landholding across Mājro (Majuro) 
Atoll as its traditional leader, Zedkaia 
served in the Nitijeḷā (Parliament) for 
twenty-four years and as the nation’s 
president from 2009 to 2012 after 
he was elected to replace Litokwa 
Tomeing, who had been removed 
from office by a vote of no confidence. 
Zedkaia was honored with a month of 
national mourning and a state funeral 
attended by thousands (mij, 16 Oct 
2015). Several other high-ranking 
irooj (chiefs) and former members of 
the Nitijeḷā also passed during this 
period. Among these was Mājro Irooj 
and former Senator Wilfred Kendall, 
who died in January 2016 after a 
long illness. Kendall’s political career 
spanned several decades and included 
accomplishments such as being elected 
repeatedly to the Congress of Micro-
nesia, serving as minister of education 
under the late President Amata Kabua 
and subsequent administrations, and 
acting as the longest-serving RMI 
ambassador to the United Nations 
(mij, 29 Jan 2016). 
Other deaths included Kuwajleen 
Aḷap (lineage head) and former Sena-
tor Sato Maie, former Arṇo Senator 
Katip Paul Mack, and Rien Morris, 
who represented Jālwōj in the Nitijeḷā 
for twenty years. The Kōle/Pikinni/Ejit 
(kbe) community also lost two lead-
ers. Nishma Jamore, kbe mayor and 
outspoken advocate of relocating the 
kbe community to the US continent, 
died of apparent complications from 
kidney disease in August 2015, while 
Marilyn Lokebol succumbed to cancer 
in June 2016, just a few months after 
her first-time election as kbe council-
woman. Two respected  religious lead-
ers also passed away: United Church 
of Christ (ucc) Pastor Wendell 
Langrine of Tucson, Arizona, died in 
August 2015 during a church confer-
ence in Mājro, and Jone Masivou, 
who came to the Marshall Islands 
from Fiji as an Assembly of God 
missionary and founded the Morning 
Star Church in Mājro in 1995, died 
in April 2016. Other beloved commu-
nity members who were lost include 
Neimon Philippo, wife of former Lae 
Atoll Senator Tipne Philippo; former 
v7ab radio announcer Waston Attari; 
Majuro Middle School special educa-
tion teacher Asmon Langidrik Jr; and 
Youth to Youth in Health Director 
Aluka Rakin. Robert Reimer’s only 
daughter Minna Pihno, who managed 
key aspects of Robert Reimers Enter-
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prises, Inc (rre) for decades, suc-
cumbed to cancer in February 2016.
The period under review was also 
one of unprecedented transformation 
in the realm of politics and leadership 
at the national and local levels, with 
the most dramatic events unfolding 
around the November 2015  elections. 
These included the controversial 
Nitijeḷā campaign by former Peace 
Corps volunteer Jack Niedenthal; the 
death of Mājro Atoll Nitijeḷā incum-
bent Iroojḷapḷap Jurelang Zedkaia; 
the mobilization of the “youth” vote 
in favor of several younger, first-time 
senators; the record election of three 
woman senators as well as several 
woman mayors and members of local 
councils; a vote of no confidence just 
two weeks after the Nitijeḷā’s selection 
of first-time Senator Casten Nemra 
of Jālwōj as president; and the subse-
quent election of Senator Hilda Heine 
of Aur as the first woman head of 
state in the RMI or any independent 
Pacific Island nation (not including 
New Zealand and Australia). While 
the election results have inspired some 
Marshall Islanders to anticipate posi-
tive changes for their communities and 
for their country as a whole, many 
continue to experience the negative 
effects of extreme poverty, limited 
access to health care and other essen-
tial services, a floundering education 
system, extreme weather events, and 
financial mismanagement at the local 
and national levels. It remains to be 
seen whether the new administration 
and the Constitutional Convention 
scheduled to take place in late 2016 
will bring about the desired changes. 
The 2015 election season went 
into full swing in October 2015 
when the attorney general’s office 
dropped its appeal of a high court 
ruling that allowed naturalized citizen 
Jack Niedenthal to stand for elec-
tion to the Nitijeḷā. In late 2014, the 
RMI Electoral Administration barred 
Niedenthal from running for office 
on the grounds that he does not have 
a Marshallese parent or a traditional 
jowi (matriclan). When Attorney 
 General Nathan Brechtefeld upheld 
the decision, Niedenthal and his 
attorney, David Strauss, brought the 
matter to the high court, arguing that 
the RMI Constitution authorizes any 
qualified voter over the age of twenty-
one to run for office. In February 
2015, the high court ruled on behalf 
of Niedenthal, declaring null and void 
the section of the Marshall Islands 
Elections and Referenda Act 1980 
that prescribed eligibility qualifica-
tions for candidates beyond age and 
citizenship. The attorney general’s 
office moved to appeal the decision in 
the RMI Supreme Court but dropped 
the request after Assistant Attorney 
General Rosalie Konou retired in 
September 2015, allowing the high 
court’s decision in favor of Nieden-
thal to stand and his campaign to 
move forward. The issue of eligibility 
requirements for election to public 
office will be addressed at the impend-
ing Constitutional Convention; in 
April 2016, Mile Senator and Minister 
of Education Wilbur Heine proposed a 
bill to amend the constitution so that 
“any person who is qualified to be a 
candidate must have land rights by 
birth and be a natural born citizen” 
(mij, 22 April 2016). 
The run-up to the election took 
another dramatic turn when, just 
weeks before Election Day, Iroojḷapḷap 
and incumbent Senator Jurelang 
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Zedkaia of Mājro died suddenly. As 
Zedkaia had served in the Nitijeḷā 
for more than two decades and was 
almost assured reelection, his death 
opened the Mājro electoral field 
significantly. When all the votes were 
counted, the results in Mājro and 
around the nation were extraordi-
nary, with fourteen out of thirty-three 
Nitijeḷā seats changing hands. Incum-
bents who lost their seats included 
Speaker of the Nitijeḷā Donald Capelle 
of Likiep, Vice Speaker Caios Lucky of 
Ujae, and five cabinet ministers includ-
ing Minister of Foreign Affairs Tony 
deBrum of Kuwajleen, Minister of 
Health Phillip Muller of Mājro, Min-
ister of Resources and Development 
Michael Konelios of Ṃaḷoeḷap, Min-
ister of Justice Rien Morris of Jālwōj, 
and Minister of Public Works Hiroshi 
Yamamura of Utrōk. Incumbents Jiba 
Kabua of Arṇo and Jeban Riklon of 
Kuwajleen were also defeated. Mājro 
Senator David Kramer, who held on 
to his seat, cited the losses as evidence 
that the people of the Marshall Islands 
“want change and new directions for 
the RMI” (mij, 27 Nov 2015).
The desire for a new direction 
for the Marshall Islands was further 
substantiated by the impressive lineup 
of newly elected senators, several 
of whom campaigned on a “voice 
of youth” platform promising fresh 
leadership and positive change for the 
future (mij, 27 Nov 2015). Victors in 
the “youth” camp included Sherwood 
Tibon and Kalani Kaneko of Mājro, 
David Paul of Kuwajleen, Bruce Bili-
mon of Ṃaḷoeḷap, and Casten Nemra 
of Jālwōj. Of particular note were 
first-time candidates Sherwood Tibon 
and Kalani Kaneko, who came in 
first and fifth, respectively, in the race 
for Mājro’s five Nitijeḷā seats and 
whose victories signaled not just voter 
discontent but also a youthful shift 
in voter demographics. In Kuwajleen, 
David Paul’s victory coincided with 
the defeat of Tony deBrum, a career 
politician and prominent international 
activist. DeBrum’s efforts over the past 
several years to bring international 
attention to the negative impacts of 
climate change and nuclear prolifera-
tion on small island nations such as 
the Marshall Islands left some constit-
uents on Ebjā (Ebeye) Island and other 
parts of Kuwajleen Atoll wondering 
how his efforts on the global stage 
have benefited them at home. Over 
the past year alone, Ebjā residents 
grappled with high rates of poverty, 
 inadequate housing,  insufficient edu-
cational opportunities, severe flood-
ing, power outages, and other chal-
lenges (mij, 27 Nov 2015).
The “youth” victory was not the 
only surprising outcome of the 2015 
election; an unprecedented number of 
women also took office at the national 
and local levels. Significantly, three 
women gained seats in the Nitijeḷā, the 
most to ever hold office at one time—
with incumbent Hilda Heine retain-
ing her seat, Daisy Alik-Momotaro 
of Jālwōj defeating incumbent Rien 
Morris, and former Senator Amenta 
Matthew of Utrōk regaining her seat 
after losing it to Hiroshi Yamamura 
in 2011. Several women also won 
mayoral seats; among these were 
Rufina Jack of Aelok, incumbent Ione 
deBrum of Epoon, and Veronica Wase 
of Likiep. In addition, several com-
munities elected women to serve as 
representatives on their local councils; 
among these were Betty Tibon-Imaikta 
of Mājro, Stacey Samuel of Mājro, 
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and Marilyn Lokebol of kbe. Other 
historic results included the election 
of the Nitijeḷā’s first-ever mother-
and-son pair Amenta Matthew and 
Sherwood Tibon, husband and wife 
Dennis Momotaro of Mājej and Daisy 
Alik-Momotaro, and three members 
of the Heine family: Hilda Heine, 
Wilbur Heine of Mile, and Thomas 
Heine of Lae. The Heine family and 
the “youth” coalition would prove 
fateful for the next series of shake-ups 
to rock national governance at the 
highest level.
Because the RMI has a mixed 
parliamentary-presidential system, 
the president of the Marshall Islands 
is elected by the Nitijeḷā rather than 
directly by voters. The election of 
a new executive was therefore the 
first and most important task of the 
Nitijeḷā after being sworn in on 4 
January 2016. With no well-defined 
or permanent political parties in the 
 Marshall Islands, the selection of 
president is usually tied to members’ 
allegiance to particular senators or 
their island(s) of origin or chiefly 
status. By the time of the swear-
ing in, three coalitions had emerged 
among the newly elected senators: 
one known simply as the “current 
government” alliance, a conglomera-
tion of largely defunct political parties 
led by Irooj and Kuwajleen Sena-
tor Michael Kabua and incumbent 
President and Aelōñḷapḷap Senator 
Christopher Loeak; the kea (Kien Eo 
Aṃ or “Your Government”) party led 
by Alvin Jacklick, who was previ-
ously a senator for Jālwōj but was 
elected this term from Kuwajleen; and 
a new coalition known initially as the 
“Solid Six” made up of newly elected 
“youth” Senators Alfred Alfred Jr of 
Aelōñḷapḷap, Jejwarick Anton of Arṇo, 
Bruce Bilimon, Casten Nemra, David 
Paul, and Sherwood Tibon. After gain-
ing a few additional members after the 
election, the Solid Six became known 
simply as the “Solids.” 
With seventeen votes needed and 
no one coalition boasting a sufficient 
number of adherents, a joint coali-
tion was required to garner enough 
votes to elect a president. Know-
ing this, several senators initiated a 
series of coalition-building meetings 
in early December; by Christmas, 
the kea’s Alvin Jacklick announced 
that a “Coalition Government” had 
been created aligning the kea and 
the Solids with enough votes to elect 
a president; the coalition came to be 
known as the “opposition coalition” 
because members were united primar-
ily in their goal of opposing incumbent 
President Christopher Loeak and his 
administration and allies (mij, 25 Dec 
2015). Potential opposition coalition 
nominees for the presidency included 
Alvin Jacklick (kea), David Kramer 
(kea), Tony Muller of Mājro (kea), 
former President Litokwa Tomeing of 
Mājro (kea), Casten Nemra (Sol-
ids), and Kessai Note (unaffiliated). 
Jacklick confirmed that the opposi-
tion coalition’s presidential pick 
would allocate cabinet appointments 
evenly, with five going to members 
of the kea and five to the Solids; in 
addition, the Speaker of the Nitijeḷā 
would come from the kea and the vice 
speaker from the  Solids. Faced with 
this opposition coalition, the current 
government had to gain the allegiance 
of members of the kea or the Solids 
to maintain any possibility of holding 
on to the  presidency. Hoping to return 
the  current government to power 
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despite the odds, Senator Michael 
Kabua quickly sought allies to join 
him in nominating a president. Pos-
sible current government contenders 
included Hilda Heine, David Kabua, 
and incumbent President Christopher 
Loeak. Given the numbers amassed by 
the kea/Solids coalition, however, it 
seemed unlikely going into the election 
that the current government would 
prevail. But there were more surprises 
to come. 
At the first meeting of the Nitijeḷā 
on 4 January, Senator Michael Kabua 
stunned everyone by choosing Casten 
Nemra of the opposition coalition as 
the current government’s nominee for 
president. Nemra had been consid-
ered for nomination by the opposi-
tion in a primary ten days earlier 
but had lost out to Alvin Jacklick. 
By  choosing a candidate who would 
draw support from the Solids and 
later owe allegiance to the current 
government for putting him in power, 
Kabua had bested the opposition. In 
the end, Nemra prevailed: he nar-
rowly defeated Jacklick by a vote of 
17 to 16. Meanwhile, the opposition 
successfully nominated Kenneth Kedi 
of Roñḷap as Speaker and Jejwarick 
Anton as vice speaker of the Nitijeḷā; 
their successful election (both won 
19 to 14) brought another first to the 
Nitijeḷā: the first time the president 
and Speaker and vice speaker were 
from two different coalitions. Presi-
dent Nemra quickly found himself in a 
tenuous position: not only did he not 
have the full support of his Speaker 
and vice speaker, but he would also 
find it difficult to select a cabinet 
agreeable to both sides. Within just 
a week of Nemra’s election to the 
nation’s highest office, rumors were 
circulating about a possible vote of no 
confidence (mij, 15 Jan 2016).
A week after the election,  Casten 
Nemra was inaugurated as the 
 seventh president of the Republic of 
the Marshall Islands. The first-time 
senator and former chief secretary 
(2008–2015) was the youngest person 
and only the second non-irooj ever 
elected to the presidency (Kessai Note 
was the first). Prior to the inaugura-
tion, Nemra faced the challenge of 
naming his cabinet ministers; caught 
between the opposition coalition of 
which he had been a member and the 
current government coalition that had 
brought him to power, Nemra found 
it difficult to select a lineup acceptable 
to both sides. The result was a partial 
cabinet list with a few picks from each 
faction and several conspicuous omis-
sions: not only were the minister of 
education and minister of health posts 
left vacant, but Hilda Heine, Wilbur 
Heine, and Thomas Heine—who had 
all served as ministers during Christo-
pher Loeak’s administration and had 
presumably supported Nemra’s elec-
tion—were not named on the cabinet 
list. The omission of Hilda Heine, 
whom many regard as uniquely quali-
fied as minister of education because 
she has a doctorate in education and 
served as minister of education under 
President Loeak, was particularly 
unexpected. Apparently, however, 
Hilda Heine and Wilbur Heine refused 
their nominations because their 
cousin and incumbent Minister of 
Justice Thomas Heine was not nomi-
nated for a cabinet post; President 
Nemra instead named Ujae Senator 
and former Attorney General Atbi 
 Riklon to the minister of justice post. 
In response, all three Heine senators 
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boycotted President Nemra’s inaugu-
ration ceremony and were soon after 
reported to be in conversation with 
the opposition coalition; meanwhile, 
several kea/Solids followers turned 
down cabinet appointments and 
asked the president to form a cabinet 
of “national unity” representing all 
three coalitions (mij, 15 Jan 2016). 
Nemra’s rejection of the suggestion, 
the defection of the Heine contingent 
to the opposition, and the 22 January 
resignation of Mike Halferty of Arṇo 
from his post as minister of transpor-
tation and communication after only 
eleven days all signaled that a vote of 
no confidence was looming.
Three days after Senator Halferty 
vacated his ministerial post and just 
fourteen days after President Nemra’s 
election, Senator John Silk of Epoon 
introduced a vote of no confidence 
on the grounds that neither President 
Nemra nor his government had a 
mandate from the Nitijeḷā or from the 
people of the Marshall Islands; what’s 
more, the president did not have a 
fully functioning cabinet and thus 
could not move the government or the 
nation forward. Although the motion 
was strongly opposed by several 
senators—including President Nemra, 
Michael Kabua, and former President 
Kessai Note—on the grounds that 
the new president had not had suf-
ficient time to form alliances or put 
forth a strong agenda, the opposition 
called for the body to reconvene the 
next day for a vote. Following a short 
twenty-four-hour recess and a call to 
vote, President Casten Nemra was 
removed from office by a successful 
vote of no confidence (21 to 12)—the 
second  successful vote out of eight 
such motions since 1998—making 
Nemra not just the youngest but also 
the shortest-serving president in the 
history of the RMI. 
Although section 7 of the RMI 
Constitution allows the Nitijeḷā 
fourteen days to elect a new presi-
dent following a successful vote of no 
confidence, Senator David Kramer 
made a motion for the election to take 
place the next day, 27 January, and 
the motion passed. Soon after dispers-
ing for the day, the opposition coali-
tion met to decide on a nominee to 
replace Nemra. On 27 January 2016, 
the opposition coalition, including 
members of the kea, the Solids, and 
several current government defec-
tors, nominated Hilda Heine as the 
next president of the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands; a vote was called 
and Dr Heine won with 24 of 30 total 
votes. Six senators abstained; three of 
these, including current government 
leaders Irooj Senator Michael Kabua 
and Irooj Senator Christopher Loeak, 
were noticeably absent. 
Hilda Heine’s election as the eighth 
president of the Republic of the Mar-
shall Islands was historic in several 
ways, not the least of which is that 
she is the first woman president of the 
Marshall Islands or any independent 
Pacific Island nation. President Heine 
was inaugurated on 28 January 2016, 
just one day after her election, and 
named her cabinet ministers within a 
few days. Although the Speaker and 
vice speaker of the Nitijeḷā remained 
in place, President Heine’s cabinet 
lineup differed significantly from that 
of her immediate predecessor; in fact, 
the only returning minister was Sena-
tor Mike Halferty, who had resigned 
his post under President Nemra after 
eleven days, in what was perhaps a 
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strategic move on his part to retain the 
post under the next administration. 
Other appointments included Senator 
John Silk as minister of foreign affairs; 
President Heine’s cousins Wilbur and 
Thomas as ministers of education and 
justice, respectively; and members 
of the original “Solid Six,” includ-
ing Alfred Alfred Jr as minister of 
resources and development and Kalani 
Kaneko as minister of health. David 
Paul, also an original Solid Sixer, 
was President Heine’s initial pick 
for minister of finance; Senator Paul 
declined the post, however, on the 
grounds that he wanted to focus on 
“get[ting] things going at Kwajalein, 
to improve Ebeye,” which was what 
he said he was primarily elected to do 
(mij, 5 Feb 2016). In Senator Paul’s 
stead, President Heine appointed 
Senator Brenson Wase of Mājro, 
who previously held the minister of 
finance post under President Kessai 
Note. Neither Senator Daisy Alik-
Momotaro (who defected from the 
opposition to the current government 
and was appointed minister of internal 
affairs under President Nemra) nor her 
husband Senator Dennis Momotaro, 
(who previously served as Minister of 
Transportation and Communication 
and Minister of Finance) received a 
cabinet  appointment.
As of this writing, it remains to be 
seen whether President Heine and the 
new administration will succeed in 
addressing the many challenges their 
local and national constituents face 
on a daily basis. Some of the most 
significant troubles that arose dur-
ing the period under review include a 
series of weather-related events that 
had dramatic local and national con-
sequences: Typhoon Nangka, which 
swept through Ānewetak Atoll and 
other areas in early July 2015, caus-
ing widespread damage totaling $9.4 
million and food and water shortages 
that lasted several months in some 
areas (mij, 27 Nov 2015); a severe 
drought caused by the El Niño South-
ern Oscillation that brought Mājro 
water reserves to a two-year low (mij, 
20 May 2016) and led US President 
Barack Obama to issue a Presidential 
Disaster Declaration to make “federal 
funding available for U.S. Govern-
ment emergency relief and reconstruc-
tion assistance” (The White House 
2016); extensive damage caused by 
king tides and storm surges on Mājro, 
Kōle, Ebjā, and other areas in October 
2015 and March 2016; and impend-
ing sea-level rise and loss of land area 
due to climate change and global 
warming. Other continuing chal-
lenges include the lingering legacies of 
nuclear testing: the reported deterio-
ration of Runit Dome on Ānewetak 
Atoll, which contains approximately 
111,000 cubic yards of radioactive 
debris (Jose, Wall, and Hinzel 2015); 
the RMI’s ongoing lawsuits against 
several nuclear-armed states; and a 
kbe resolution to seek US govern-
ment legislation that would allow the 
people of Pikinni to use money from 
the Resettlement Trust Fund for the 
People of Bikini to relocate to the 
United States. 
In an effort to chart a new course 
and find solutions to these and other 
challenges threatening the future of 
the RMI, the Nitijeḷā unanimously 
adopted Bill 70 in September 2015 
requiring that a Constitutional Con-
vention (Con-Con) be held. In May 
2016, the Pre-Constitutional Con-
vention Committee informed Presi-
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dent Heine that an election to select 
representatives to the Con-Con will 
take place on 11 October 2016, and 
the convention will commence within 
sixty days of the election. The Con-
Con will have a total of 45 members: 
33 elected from Nitijeḷā districts and 
12 irooj selected by consensus to 
represent the various island groups. 
Many Marshall Islanders are looking 
to the Con-Con to resolve a number 
of structural matters they believe are 
negatively impacting their lives and 
livelihoods; as the 2015 election cycle 
revealed, the procedure for electing the 
country’s chief executive and the rules 
for who can represent them in public 
office are perhaps among the most 
pressing. Depending on the conven-
tion’s outcome, 2015 may have been 
the first and last election in which a 
naturalized citizen without land rights 
by birth could run for the Nitijeḷā and 
the last time Marshall Islanders were 
denied the right to vote directly for 
president. 
Widespread support for the 
impending Con-Con is just one more 
indication that the people of the 
Marshall Islands want change and 
new directions for their nation. It 
also reveals that, as Tongan scholar 
Epeli Hau‘ofa so aptly noted, Mar-
shall Islanders do not just “live day to 
day, not really caring for the long-
term benefits” and outcomes of their 
actions and decisions, but rather “plan 
for generations, for the continuity and 
improvement of their families and kin 
groups” (Hau‘ofa 1994, 159). In the 
coming months, they can only hope 
that their elected and traditional lead-
ers will do the same.
monica c labriola
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Republic of Palau
The period under review was one that 
brought about landmark policies and 
historic moments for the Republic of 
Palau and for its leadership, includ-
ing issues related to infrastructure 
development, climate change, and 
the ocean. The year brought together 
both elected and traditional lead-
ers to address issues regarding the 
welfare of the people. It was also a 
time of  transition as important lead-
ers who had contributed greatly to 
the country’s national development 
passed on and others stepped into the 
political scene to lead as Palau contin-
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ued to advance its goals of national 
 development. 
The Republic of Palau made an 
ambitious attempt to further con-
serve its marine resources through 
legislation by declaring its waters a 
national marine sanctuary and closing 
80 percent of its Exclusive Economic 
Zone (eez) to commercial fishing. 
Legislation was first introduced in 
the Senate of the Ninth Olbiil Era 
Kelulau (oek) by the Honorable 
Senator Hokkons Baules on 7 March 
2013, which precipitated President 
Tommy Remengesau Jr’s declaration 
of the Palau National Marine Sanctu-
ary at the 69th Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly in 2014. 
The legislation remained in the Sen-
ate until 2015, while the president 
continuously advocated for its passage 
by rallying the leadership of Palau 
behind his vision. On 15 October 
2015, the Senate passed the bill on its 
third and final reading and sent it to 
the House of Delegates of the oek for 
 consideration.
As the biggest initiative for Presi-
dent Remengesau’s third administra-
tion moved through the legislative 
process, Palau’s leadership welcomed 
assistance from the Pew Charitable 
Trusts to help with the marine sanc-
tuary campaign. Local community 
support was part of the campaign, and 
even the rural villages of Palau par-
ticipated in the national debate. The 
additional pressure from local people 
gained even greater momentum when 
community members, women’s organi-
zations, and students graced the Palau 
National Congress wearing “BUL” 
t-shirts (“bul” is Palauan for morato-
rium, which is a Palauan traditional 
conservation method that allows a 
diminishing resource time to replenish 
itself) and holding signs promoting 
the marine sanctuary during Remenge-
sau’s State of the Republic Address in 
April 2015. Action on the bill was not 
taken immediately thereafter, but the 
growing awareness and concern on the 
part of the community could not be 
ignored and became the basis of many 
discussions in leadership meetings. 
Procedurally, the bill was originally 
assigned to the Senate Committee 
on Resource, Commerce, Trade, and 
Development, chaired by the Honor-
able Senator Mason Whipps. The 
committee reported the bill to the 
 Senate floor and recommended its 
passage (Senase 2015c), but the report 
was not adopted and was instead 
moved to the Senate Committee on 
Maritime, Environment, and Protected 
Areas, chaired by the Honorable 
 Senator Mlib Tmetuchl. Before the 
latter committee took any action on 
the bill, however, the report from the 
original committee was recalled to 
the floor and adopted, which enabled 
progress leading ultimately to the 
bill’s passage. Deemed by some to be 
a controversial measure, the marine 
sanctuary bill attempted to address 
some major issues, including environ-
mental conservation and preserva-
tion, through a proposed increase in 
Palau’s environmental impact fee as 
well as the establishment of a visa 
requirement for noncitizens who hold 
passports from countries other than 
the United States, Federated States of 
Micronesia, or Republic of the Mar-
shall Islands. These two steps would 
help alleviate some of the economic 
loss that would be felt as the fishing 
revenues began to decline as a result of 
the law (Senase 2015a).
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While it was being deliberated in 
the oek, the Palau National Marine 
Sanctuary bill received growing sup-
port regionally and internationally 
despite the delays for its consider-
ation in the Senate (Island Times 
2015b). Neighboring Pacific Island 
countries including Kiribati, Tuvalu, 
and Nauru endorsed the marine 
sanctuary initiative, and the presi-
dents of neighboring Federated States 
of Micronesia and Republic of the 
Marshall Islands joined with Palau 
in calling on the Parties to the Nauru 
Agreement (pna)—a subregional 
fisheries arrangement that controls a 
sizable portion of the lucrative tuna 
fishery in the Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean—to support the initia-
tive. Internationally, Palau’s marine 
sanctuary initiative was supported and 
endorsed by prominent environmen-
tal groups such as the Ocean Elders, 
whose membership includes Prince 
Albert of Monaco, National Geo-
graphic Explorer-in- Residence Sylvia 
Earle, and Ted Turner of cnn (Senase 
2015c). Two years and seven months 
after its first reading in the Senate, the 
Palau National Marine Sanctuary Act 
became law when President Remenge-
sau signed the legislation on 28 Octo-
ber 2015 as rppl 9-49. In his letter 
to the oek leadership following his 
signing, the president said, “This open 
and energetic process has been a true 
test of our nation’s ability to confront 
the issues of our time through active 
participation at every level” (Office of 
the President 2015). 
Around the same time that the 
marine sanctuary act became law, the 
oek established the Belau Submarine 
Cable Corporation (bscc) as a step 
toward the solution to Palau’s tele-
communications concerns, including 
the slow speed of Internet and limited 
connectivity throughout some parts of 
the republic. The creation of a corpo-
ration to act as the implementation 
agency for the project was a condition 
for an Asian Development Bank (adb) 
loan, which would be used to procure 
the fiber optic cable to connect Palau 
to the Southeast Asia–United States 
(sea-us) cable system and facilitate 
high-speed Internet access for Palau 
(Island Times 2015a). 
As with the Palau National Marine 
Sanctuary Act, the bill to create the 
Belau Submarine Cable Corporation 
met resistance in the Senate. Some 
senators expressed the view that, 
rather than create another corpora-
tion, the existing Palau National Com-
munications Corporation (pncc) was 
a sufficient public corporation to take 
on the responsibilities set out in the 
bill. These differences caused signifi-
cant divergence between the House 
and Senate versions of the bill (Island 
Times 2015b). The House rejected 
the Senate version, which led to the 
creation of a conference committee to 
further deliberate on the bill and see 
where compromise could be made to 
allow for the bill to be passed. The 
adb made clear that its loan was con-
tingent on the creation of a separate 
corporation because of pncc’s debt, 
estimated to be about us$30 mil-
lion. After extensive discussions and 
negotiations ultimately including the 
agreement to create the bscc, the bill 
was amended further into a version 
that was amenable to the Senate, the 
House, and the adb. 
In his 21 September 2015 signing 
statement for the Belau Submarine 
Cable Corporation Act (rppl 9-47), 
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President Remengesau reiterated 
the importance of the legislation by 
saying, “Fiber optic connectivity will 
open the doors to opportunities such 
as e-Health, e-Education, and an 
improved offering for tourists visit-
ing Palau” (Senase 2015d). He also 
reminded Palauans that the act was 
only a first step and that the project 
would require the cooperation of 
the different branches of the Palau 
national government. Shortly there-
after, the Senate introduced a joint 
resolution to approve, authorize, and 
ratify the authority of the president to 
secure a loan from the adb to ensure 
Palau’s participation in the sea-us 
cable system (Senase 2015f). 
The year 2015 was also a signifi-
cant transitional one for the Republic 
of Palau because of the passing of a 
female icon in Palauan society: the 
Honorable Kathy Kesolei, an oek sen-
ator. The nation felt the weight of the 
terrible loss, as Senator Kesolei, who 
was serving as the Senate’s vice presi-
dent at the time and was one of the 
most respected women leaders in the 
republic, passed away on 13 October 
2015 in Manila, Philippines, due to 
health problems (Senase 2015b). Sena-
tor Kesolei had also served as  Senate 
vice president in the Eighth oek, 
and her stellar leadership both in the 
Eighth and Ninth Olbiil Era  Kelulau 
ably ensured that Palauan culture 
was given due regard during delibera-
tions on many pieces of legislation. 
Kesolei was an anthropologist and 
an educator earlier in her career, and 
she dedicated over thirty years of her 
life to public service, serving on many 
boards, authorities, and commissions 
(Senase 2015b). One of her greatest 
legacies was her effort to uphold and 
protect traditional knowledge and 
Palauan culture amid changing times. 
The seat left vacant by Senator 
Kesolei’s passing was to be filled for 
the remainder of the term, pursuant 
to Palau laws. Accordingly, the Senate 
adopted a resolution acknowledging 
the vacancy and calling for a special 
election to occur within thirty to sixty 
days of adoption of the resolution. 
Interestingly, in the special election 
that was held on 22 December 2015, 
only two of the six candidates were 
men. Those on the ballot were former 
Senate President Seit Andres, former 
Vice President Sandra S Pierantozzi, 
former Senator Regina Mesebeluu, 
former Minister of Community and 
Cultural Affairs Faustina Rehuher-
Marugg, Mr Jeff Ngirarsaol, and 
Ms Margie Borja Dalton. This was 
the first time that female candidates 
had outnumbered male candidates 
in a  special election in Palau (Senase 
2015e). Seasoned politician Pieran-
tozzi won the special election.
As campaigns were slowly getting 
into full swing in Palau at the end 
of 2015, other events of importance 
were also taking place. In December 
2015, the world came together in a 
great show of unity to combat the 
worldwide threat of climate change 
by adopting the Paris Agreement. In 
a House Joint Resolution, the oek 
adopted the agreement, thus allow-
ing Palau to submit its instrument of 
ratification and become a party to the 
agreement (Reklai 2016), the second 
country in the world to do so. The 
ratification of the agreement occurred 
in February 2016, when the 21st 
Micronesian Chief Executives Sum-
mit meeting was being held in Palau. 
As evidence of the clear and present 
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danger posed by climate change, at the 
very time of Palau’s ratification, the 
Federated States of Micronesia and 
the Republic of the Marshall Islands 
had already declared states of emer-
gency because of the El Niño effect 
challenging the two countries. In his 
statement during the summit, Presi-
dent Remengesau reminded people, 
“Yet while we can take heart from 
the fact that we are finally beginning 
to respond to the impacts of climate 
change at the global, regional and 
national level, we here in Micronesia 
are once again faced with a very real 
impact of climate change, a severe 
weather condition known as El Niño.” 
In addition, Remengesau noted, “In 
Palau, we are experiencing forest 
fires, the browning of our beautiful 
Rock Islands and dangerously low 
water levels in our reservoir” (Carreon 
2016). Climate change poses a real 
threat to the islands as Palau along 
with its Micronesian neighbors were 
also feeling the effects of low rainfall 
(Villanueva-Dizon 2016).
On 22 March 2016, in response to 
El Niño effects in Palau, the presi-
dent declared a state of emergency, 
stipulated in Executive Order 389. 
The order cited reports from the US 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Agency’s forecasting as well as recent 
water rationing efforts as the country 
was experiencing its lowest recorded 
amount of rainfall since 1954. Water 
levels were rapidly decreasing, and 
many feared that water rationing 
would be an insufficient measure 
(Remengesau 2016). The oek, by the 
power vested in it through the Palau 
Constitution, immediately confirmed 
the state of emergency, giving the pres-
ident emergency powers for a period 
of ten days. As stated in the constitu-
tion (article VIII, section 14), “The 
President shall not exercise  emergency 
powers for a period of more than 
ten (10) days without express and 
continuing consent of the Olbiil Era 
Kelulau.” Accordingly, President 
Remengesau asked for an extension 
at the end of the first ten days, and 
that request was confirmed again by 
the oek. Drought conditions had not 
improved at the end of the first exten-
sion, so the president sought a second 
extension of ten days for the state of 
emergency. That would have meant 
a total of thirty days of emergency 
powers granted to the president. The 
request for a second extension was not 
supported by enough members of the 
Senate; therefore the resolution was 
not adopted. The rejection became the 
basis of further discussions among the 
leadership of the republic that raised 
many important issues, including the 
constitutionality of the actions that 
were taken. 
Amid all of this, President 
Remengesau delivered his fourth 
State of the Republic Address. The 
drought situation was a key element 
in his speech, in which he praised the 
resilience of the Palauan people and 
reminded Palauans of the emergency 
situations that Palau had experienced 
and overcome in the past. He listed 
some of the accomplishments of his 
administration, with due regard to the 
passage of the Palau National Marine 
Sanctuary Act and the developments 
thereafter. The president also took 
the opportunity to name some critical 
achievements of the joint collabora-
tion between the different branches of 
government that allowed for progress 
on the improvement of telecommu-
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nications and an increase in social 
 security benefits, among other mat-
ters. But the state of emergency still 
took center stage in his address as he 
awaited the confirmation of the oek 
for a second extension of the state of 
emergency.
After the Senate’s rejection of the 
president’s second request for an 
extension of the state of emergency, 
the divergence in views about it led to 
the convening of a national leadership 
meeting inclusive of both traditional 
and elected leaders. At the meeting, 
the National Emergency Committee, 
which is the coordinating body for 
emergency and disaster preparedness 
and response that works closely with 
the National Emergency Manage-
ment Office, was able to present its 
report supporting the president’s 
request for an extension. Remengesau 
also expressed his concerns, citing 
the ease of seeking assistance from 
international partners and allies if 
Palau was still in a state of emergency. 
Newly elected Senator Pierantozzi, 
a veteran of the political scene, said 
that the drought situation was already 
being addressed by the measures 
that were put in place to ensure that 
people were receiving the water they 
needed and that those services were 
not going to be cut off if an exten-
sion of the state of emergency was 
not approved. Those sentiments were 
further expressed in a letter to the Sen-
ate president from senators opposing 
the second extension. The senators 
also said that it was a difficult decision 
on their part as they understood that 
the people were experiencing hard-
ships as a result of the drought, but 
they believed their actions were taken 
 pursuant to their responsibility to 
uphold the Constitution of the Repub-
lic of Palau (Marianas Variety 2016b).
Efforts and actions that were taken 
to address the issue of the drought 
sought to meet the needs not only of 
the people but also of the tourism 
industry, to ensure that the country’s 
main economic driver did not suf-
fer too harshly from the drought 
(Marianas Variety 2016a). The Palau 
Visitors Authority reported that there 
was a decline in tourism in early 2016 
due in part to the drought. Tourism is 
the biggest industry in Palau and will 
become even more significant with 
the partial closure of the Palau eez 
and the projected decline in fishing 
 revenues. 
As Palau was still experiencing 
the drought, President Remengesau 
made a decision to travel to New 
York to attend the High-Level Signing 
Ceremony of the Paris Agreement in 
April. In his statement, Remengesau 
explained, “It was difficult for me to 
leave my country in a time of crisis, 
but I felt it was important for me to 
be here to make this appeal to the 
international community. For small, 
vulnerable countries, climate change 
is already pushing us to the brink. 
We cannot wait until 2020 for imple-
mentation. There are many affordable 
solutions that continue to go unused, 
while dangerous impacts happen as we 
speak.” He also stressed that the peo-
ple of Palau have “shown incredible 
patience during this crisis, despite their 
frustration.” The president took the 
opportunity to underscore the urgent 
need for international assistance 
while also recognizing the generosity 
of international allies like Japan and 
Taiwan that had provided emergency 
relief (Remengesau 2016). 
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During the period under review, 
state governments also witnessed the 
greater involvement of women in 
elected positions. In December 2015, 
Ilolang Sisca R Vogt became governor 
of Ngeremlengui State, and Huana 
Nestor won the gubernatorial seat that 
had been left vacant on the resignation 
of former Hatohobei State Governor 
Thomas Patris. Governor Nestor also 
secured the same seat in the following 
general election for Hatohobei State, 
in which a woman lieutenant gover-
nor and three female legislators were 
also elected. Those women joined 
other female elected officials from 
the various states and contributed to 
the growing female representation in 
national and state elected leadership 
roles. 
The region celebrated the Twelfth 
Festival of Pacific Arts (FestPac) in 
Guam from 22 May to 4 June 2016. 
To distinguish Palau’s participation in 
this festival, several members of the 
Palauan delegation journeyed to Guam 
from Palau in an epic voyage aboard 
the sailing vessel Alingano Maisu. The 
Alingano Maisu sailed using tradi-
tional instrument-free navigational 
methods under the leadership of 
master navigator Sesario Sewalur. The 
double-hulled voyaging canoe arrived 
in Guam in time for the festivities, but 
unfortunately the end of the trip was 
marred by tragedy. Murais Sebangiol, 
a FestPac delegate from Melekeok 
who had studied traditional seafaring 
methods, passed away shortly after 
the canoe reached Guam (Guzman 
2016). Despite the untimely passing 
of one of Palau’s sons, the republic, 
represented by many artists, dancers, 
and singers as well as traditional and 
elected leaders, still showcased stellar 
performances throughout the duration 
of the festival, depicting the unity of 
the people of Palau.
With the national primary elec-
tions just around the corner on 27 
September 2016, many citizens have 
filed petitions to hold elected office 
in Palau. As of press time, President 
Remengesau had yet to officially file 
for reelection but had already begun 
actively campaigning. Also vying for 
the top office are Senator Pierantozzi, 
two-term Senator Surangel Whipps Jr, 
and incumbent Vice President Anto-
nio Bells. Joining these prospective 
candidates in the primary elections are 
three hopefuls for the vice presidency: 
former Senate President and current 
Senator Mlib Tmetuchl, Senate Floor 
Leader Raynold B Oilouch, and Koror 
State Governor Yositaka Adachi. 
There are many other hopefuls for 
the other seats in the oek in both the 
Senate and the House of Delegates, 
and it is anticipated that many more 
will enter these races before the filing 
deadline of 3 August 2016. 
As elections near, 2016 promises to 
continue to be a significant year for 
the Republic of Palau. Furthermore, 
this is the first year of implementation 
following the September 2015 adop-
tion by the United Nations General 
Assembly of the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals, which replaced the 
Millennium Development Goals (UN 
Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs 2015), and national efforts are 
being coordinated to ensure that the 
Palauan people are working diligently 
to do their part in achieving the 
targets of each of the seventeen goals. 
There are still many issues that must 
be addressed, but Palauans under-
stand that through civic engagement 
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and democratic discourse, Palau will 
continue to tackle the issues and seek 
solutions, just as it has always done. 
landisang l kotaro
The opinions expressed in this 
review are those of the author and do 
not necessarily reflect the official views 
of the government of the  Republic of 
Palau.
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